William Whewell's Moral Philosophy

Now what is the character which we designate in an action, by saying that it is right? In so describing it, there is this Idea conveyed:--we render a reason for it, which reason is paramount to all other considerations. If the action be right, it is no valid reason against doing it, that it is unpleasant or dangerous. We are not to do what is pleasant and wrong. We are to do what is unpleasant if it be right. All mankind acknowledge this, as the Rule of their Common Moral Nature:--that is, of their Common Nature by which they know that there is a meaning in right and wrong. And thus right, absolutely used, implies the Supreme rule:--it implies an ultimate and final reason of man's actions: a universal and absolute rule of man's being.

The supreme and universal rule of man's being is the rule which is supreme in its authority over all his faculties, powers, and impulses:--and this supreme rule will separate itself into partial rules according to the faculties, powers, and impulss which it has to govern. And by the very condition that it is a supreme and absolute rule, joined with the conditions which man's constitution supplies, we see, with irresistible evidence, the authority of certain fundamental moral truths; we thus discern the necessary existence of certain virtues as parts of this supreme rule of human action.

For instance: man lives in society with man; his actions and theirs have a mutual reference: his actions derive their effect, derive their meaning, from his own actions and those of his fellow men; and not present actions only, but past and future. He has the faculty of Speech, which is the means by which a man's past actions mainly, his future actions entirely, are connected with the actions (internal actions, hopes and fears, as well as external actions) of other men. His whole being cannot be under a Supreme Rule, a rule of right and wrong, except the use of this faculty, the faculty of Speech,--as declaring his purposed future actions, for instance--be under such a rule. There must be, for the use of Speech, a rule of right and wrong:--a universal and supreme rule. But the ultimate and supreme distinction of the use of Speech is that of truth and falsehood. And it is plain that there can be no ultimate and supreme rule on this subject, except that rule which makes truth to be right and falsehood to be wrong. And thus, one part of the supreme rule is, that Truth is right: that is is right to speak the Truth: that Veracity is a Virtue.

And in like manner, when we consider man as a social being, constantly and universally desiring, using, and appropriating the things which exist in the world--having them as Possessions and Property--it is plain that there can be no universal rule of his actions, except there be a universal rule respecting Property:--and that the universal rule, being the rule of his being as well as of his external actions, msut affect his desires of property, and his regards towards it on all occasions. And as the unviersal rule of Property must be that each man must have his own, (for this is involved in the meaning of Property,) the rule of man's internal being must be in harmony with this rule: and the man must desire that each have his own. And this disposition is Justice, which thus is seen to be a Virtue.

And in like manner, other virtues are seen to be necessary parts of the Supreme Rule, by taking into account other parts of the constitution of man:--Humanity, by considering his Affections:--Purity, by considering his Bodily Desires:--Order and Rule in general, by considering his Reason.

And thus the answer to the objection urged against the recognition of certain Virtues,--Veracity, Justice, Humanity, and the like--as the basis of Morality, on the grounds of their vague character, would be this:--that Veracity, Justice, Humanity, are not merely vague, indefinite and insecure notions;--that we have certain definite Ideas of such Virtues which necessarily arise in our minds, when we consider the constitution of human nature, with its various elements and faculties, as subject to a supreme and universal Rule;--that the praise of being truthful, or just, or humane, is a praise which has always the same meaning as to the general Idea, though there may be different views as to how far the Idea is exemplifeid in any special case;--that the measure of each virtue is to be found ina due regulation of that part of the constitution of man to which that virtue specially relates;--and that the ground of this regulation is, that without such partial regulation of portions of the constitution of man, there could be no general and universal rule of man's being,--no absolute right and wrong,--and thus, no moral nature at all. There must be such Virtues as Veracity, Justice, Humanity, and others, in order that there may be such a thing as Virtue;--in order that man may be a moral creature.

This view of the nature and foundation of Morality agrees, I think, with the common notions of mankind; who, in pronouncing Veracity, Justice, Humanity, to be virtues, are guided and determined by a conviction taht these virtues are due and right regulations of the Faculty of Speech, the Desire of external things, and the Affections: and not by an aprpehension of any extraneous purposes which these virteus are to answer. And when we attempt to carry this view further into detail, and to determine how far special acts are right and wrong, we still follow the course which men follow in their ordinary judgments of one another's actions, or their own. An action is right, if it be, or at least so far as itis, truthful, just, humane. This is the ordinary sense of mankind. but again: Is a certain act truthful? To know that, we must consider what we mean by Truth; and how far it is found in the case which we have before us: and the like of Justice, of Humanity, of Purity, and of other Virtues.

...If it be asked, to which of our English Moralists the Scheme of Morality here presented most nearly approaches, I reply, that it follows Butler in his doctrine, that by the mere contemplation of our human faculties and springs of action, we can discern certain relations which must exist among them, but the necessity of man's moral being. He maintains that, by merely comparing appetite and reflection or conscience, as springs of action,w e see that the latter is superior in its nature, and ought to rule (fn). This truth, I, with him, conceive to be self-evident; and I endeavour to express it by stating, as a fundamental Moral Principle, that the Lower Parts of our Nature are to be governed by the Higher. And I conceive that there are several other Moral Principles which are, in like manner, self-evident. For isntance, considering men as social beings, capable of mutual understanding expressed in speech, and also as moral beings, subject to a rule of right and wrong, I conceive it to be self-evident that the rule of their being must include veracity: the question whether it shall or shall not be man's duty to speak the truth, appears to me to be capable of being answered, like the other, "from the economy and constitution of human nature." If we compare the Idea of Truth with the Idea of Moral Rules for man, we see that the former is necessarily included in the latter (fn). And in the same manner, if we consider men as creatures desiring and appropriating the things of the external world, and also as being sliving under a moral rule, we see that it must be part of the moral rule that each should not desire what is the property of another. And in like manner, it is self-evident, that each man should abstain from violence and anger towards others;--that man must love his fellowmen: it is evident, I say, on a thoughtful consideration of man's moral and social condition, that his must be a part of the general rule of his being, however much there may be, under particular circumstances, cases in which anger on moral grounds is permitted by the rule. As I have already said, this obligation of universal love was assented to as a truth, however strikign, yet self-evident, by the shout of the Roman theatre, uttered at a period when the Romans had outgrown the original narrowness and ferocity of their character.

If the evident truth of such moral principles be fully assented to, it is of little consequence whether or not we term them Axioms. But we may observe that there is nothing inconsistent with their being Axioms, in their requiring calm reflection, steady thought, and a developement of the moral ideas, in order to a full apprehension of their evidence and generality; for such reflection, thought, and developement of the (geometrical) ideas, are requisite to the full apprehension even of geometrical Axioms; and the like is true in other portion sof human knowledge. We may very reasonably call it an Axiom that Veracity is a Duty, if it be a truth which becomes more and more evident exactly as the Ideas of Duty and of Veracity become more and more clear in our minds.

And the Maxims which we have stated:--that the Lower Parts of Human Nature must be governed by the Higher;--that truth must be spoken;--that we must not desire what is another's;--that man is to be loved as man;--and it may be, some others, have also this further character of Axioms,--that we do not and cannot deduce them, in their full evidence and extent, from any more fundamental principles of which they are the consequences and applications. They are primary prinipcles, and are established in our minds simply by a contemplation of our moral nature and condition; or, what expresses the same thing, by intuition.

It may be objected to this, that these principles, or at least some of them, are supported by reasoning; for instance, the principle that truth must be spoken, may be shown to be necessary to the comfort and well-being of men in society; since men must needs be constantly dependent upon one another, and if they could not reckon upon this dependence, in virtue of the general acceptation of the Rule of veracity, they must be put to the greatest inconvenience, and suffer much misery. But upon this we may observe, that such a consideration of the intolerable consequences which would follow if the maxim were not true, does not necessarily prevent its being a primary principle, intuitively apprehended. For with regard to other axioms also, one mode of brinign before our minds their necessary truth is, to try to picture to ourselves what would be the consequence of supposing them not true. Thus, in some books of geometry, there are attempts to explain what the consequences would be if two straight lines could enclose a space: and it is easily shown that if we imagine the opposite principle to be untrue, the grossest and most intolerable incongruities in the relations of lines to one another must necessarily be admitted.

Moreover, no consideration of the evil consequences which would ensue if such cardinal and moral maxims as the above were false, can be the ground of our belief in them; for no such consideration can prove these maxims true, in that full and pervading application which men spontaneously give them. For men not only assent to the maxim that truth must be spoken, in promises and the like; but when they are led to consider what is a fit maxim fro man as a moral being, whose will, purpose, thought, as well as his acts, must be governed by a rule of right and wrong, they do not hesitate to decide that in will, purpose, and thought, as well as in act, falsehood is forbidden him; that he must be truthful in his heart, and a lover of truth, in order to be such as he ought to be. And the like universality and fulness of application men give to all other fundamental moral maxims. It is indeed this application to man's will, purposes, thoughts, desires, affections, which especially makes them to be moral principles, and not merely rules of external action.

Certain moral principles being, as I have said, thus seen to be true by intuition, under due conditions of reflection and thought, are unfolded into their application by further reflection and thought. When we have come to the conviction that Truth, Justice, and the like, are the rule of our being, we have to consider, What is Truth, and What is Justice, in special cases. In pursuing this inquiry, we have to attend both to the external conditoins and to the internal essence of moral action; and we are thus led to perceive that between the external conditions and the internal essence, ther eis a kind of necessary and universal anthithesis;--the antithesis which occurs in so many forms and in so many places, of Idea and Fact. Man is to do what the Supreme Rule of his being requires, under the circumstances. The Supreme Rule of his being, an internal principle, governs his thoughts, habits, purposes; but yet, his thoughts, habits, purposes, depend upon external circumstances also; his very being is what it has been made by his education and his history; by the history of his family and his nation; and thus, by the history of the world, of which that of his nation is a branch. There is thus a factual or historical side of every moral question, as well as a purely moral side; there are in it external elements, given by man's history, as well as internal rules, given by man's moral constitution. Thus every moral question is, on one side, historical. What a man ought to do, at every step, depends in some way upon what he already has done, and has, and is. And hence our absolute solutions of moral questions, and our applications of moral rules, must all be, in some measure, imperfect, partial, and hypothetical.

For instance, Morality must, in some measure at least, depend upon Law. IT is wrong to steal, to covet, to desire what is another's. But the law alone can determine what is another's. That is a historical question; and that datum, as given by law and hsitory, must enter into our moral discussions. But yet the legal historical datum is not an absolute and final point:--for the law must be an unjust law; the history may be a series of wrong-doing; and thus, law and history may be judged, and may be modified, by morality. But again, however much modified, there will still remain a law and a history as Fats, as external elements, as the conditions by which the Idea of Justice is to be limited and exemplified. And thus, the antithesis of Idea and Fact in moral questions can never be got rid of, however the boundary line between the two opposite regions may change.

I may once more remark, tha this method of deciding questions of Morality which I have thus described, and which I have followed in the present work, is that which men ordinarily follow, when they examine such questions by the spontaneous exercise of their common faculties. I think it must be obvious to any one, on consideration, that men, when they have to determine whether any course of action is to be approved and admired, do not (except when biassed by special adopted systems) inquire whether such a course tends either to general or to particular interest and gratification; but whether it exhibits Justice, Veracity, Kindness, Purity, and Wisdom. If they are satisfied that an action is just, faithful, benevolent, pure, wise, they willingly believe indeed that it tends to promote human happiness and the happiness of the actor in the long run (as we also teach); but even if they are not able to see this, and if there appear to be, so far as human eyes can discern, an overbalance of pain and inconvenience in the act, still, if it be thus an example of virtue, they approve and aadmire it. Butler expresses the Comon Judgment of mankind, when he says, that we are not competent judges of what is, taking all its remotest consequences into account, for the good of the world; and that go has given us other ways of discerning our duty (fn).

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I have been led, by such considerations as those above stated, to lay down, as the Fundamental Points of Morality, these Virtues or Principles;--(162) Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose. These appear to me, as I have said, to possess an axiomatic authority as Moral Principles:--to be virtues of which the excellency and obligation are clearly seen, in proportion as the Idea of Virtue is clearly apprehended and applied to the various faculties and impulses which enter into the constitution of man. These Principles appear to me also to occupy the whole sphere of man's Duty, so far as it offers itself to the eye of human reason; and therefore to afford a proper framework for a system of rational Morality.

I conceive (as I stated also in the First Edition,) that there is a great convenience in the Division of the general trunk of Morality into five great branches: the Morality of Reason; the Morality of Religion; Jurisprudence; Polity; International Law. These five provinces, though intimately conencted, appear to be distinct, and their boundaries tolerably well defined. The questions belonging to each, are different. I hope in particular that the separation of the Morality of Religion from that of mere Reason will be approved of. This separation enables us to trace the results of the moral guidance of human Reason consistently and continuously, while we still retain a due sense of the superior authority of Religion; and it leads us to see tha tin many places this guidance of human Reason is insufficient without religion, and that Religion is the higher guide which we need;--the necessary supplement to a mere rational Morality.